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ROBERT F. NAGEL
FEDERALISM AS A FUNDAMENTAL
VALUE: NATIONAL LEAGUE OF
CITIES IN PERSPECTIVE
In examining the Constitution of the United States...
one is startled at the variety of information and the excel-
lence of discretion which it presupposes in the people whom
it is meant to govern. The government of the Union de-
pends entirely upon legal fictions; the Union is an ideal
nation which only exists in the mind, and whose limits and
extent can only be discerned by the understanding.
[ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE*]
A. INTRODUCTION
After almost forty years of sanctioning the growth of the con-
gressional power to regulate commerce,' the Supreme Court in
National League of Cities v. Usery2 held that the extension of the wage
and hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act to most state
employees was unconstitutional as a violation of the principle of
federalism. Although some serious commentary had suggested that
the Court's record prior to Usery verged on abdication of constitu-
tional responsibilities, 3 Usery precipitated criticism that was ex-
Robert F. Nagel is Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
* I Democracy in America 152 (Arlington House ed. 1970).
1 For a history, see NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-56
(1978).
2 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
a The basic constitutional "test" (whether the regulation "affected" commerce) was im-
mediately understood to provide no limitation on national power. "Almost anything-
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
0-226-46434-2/82/1981-0022$01.00
traordinary both for its breadth and severity. Justice Brennan, a
respected and unapologetic practitioner of judicial power and
imaginative constitutional analysis when the issues involve indi-
viduals' rights, labeled the decision "an abstraction without sub-
stance" and a "patent usurpation."4 Three prominant scholars
reacted to the decision extremely critically. Professors Tribe and
Michelman, both resourceful at constitutional interpretation, pro-
fessed themselves totally unable to understand the explanation of-
fered by the Court in Usery and proposed that the decision could
make sense only as an inchoate statement of a right to the provision
of certain state services. 5 Professor Choper reacted with a forceful
argument that, even if Usery were constitutionally correct on the
merits, the Court should have held such matters to be nonjustici-
able in order to save its resources for-that phrase again-the pro-
tection of individual rights. 6 Many others also criticized Usery,7 and
those who were at all supportive of the decision were muted or
ambivalent.8
The harsh reaction to Usery is one aspect of a widespread pattern
that inverts the priorities of the framers: an obsessive concern for
using the Constitution to protect individuals' rights. This fascina-
tion with rights reinforces a form of instrumentalism that is too
marriage, birth, death-may in some fashion affect commerce." National Labor Relations
Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 99 (1937) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
By 1959 Professor Wechsler could refer to "the virtual abandonment of limits [to the federal
commerce power]." Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1,
23-24 (1959). Cf. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 Sup. Cr. REv. 34.
4 426 U.S. at 858, 860. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to
Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1066 (1977) ("I make no claims about
what the Justices intended.... I haven't a clue what that might have been, but I doubt that
the conclusion of this article was it."); Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations
of"Sovereignty" in National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 YALE L. J. 1165, 1166 (1977) ("The only
interpretation that is compatible with the decision taken as a whole, I shall argue, is a
surprising one that leads in directions the Justices do not seem to have intended or antici-
pated.").
6 Choper, The Scope of National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability ofJudicial Review,
86 YALE L. J. 1552 (1977).
7 E.G., ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 224 n. 44 (1980); Barber, National League of
Cities v. Usery: New Meaning for the Tenth Amendment? 1976 SuP. CT. REV. 161; Cox,
Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1978); Tushnet,
The Dilemmas of Liberal Constitutionalism, 42 OHIO ST. L. J. 411, 420-421, (1981).
8 E.g., Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State Implementa-
tion of National Environment Policy, 86 YALEL. J. 1196, 1224-25, 1271 (1977); Kaden, Politics,
Money, and State Sovereignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847 (1979).
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confining to be an adequate way to think about constitutional law.
If Usery is viewed without these intellectual constraints, a rather
plain and defensible explanation for the decision emerges. My
major purpose is not to insist that Usery was ultimately "correct,"
but to suggest that the inability to understand Usery demonstrates
the extent to which the capacity to appreciate some important con-
stitutional principles is being lost.
I.
Judicial decisions generally reflect a priority in favor of pro-
tecting individuals' rights over the structural principles of separa-
tion of powers and federalism. Decisions directly resting on these
structural principles are rare compared with decisions involving
individual rights. 9 Issues of federalism and separation of powers are
usually analyzed in terms of nonconstitutional doctrines. For
example, they are frequently reduced to matters of statutory con-
struction'" The scope of the judicial power over states is often
discussed in amorphous, discretionary terms-such as equitable
discretion, standing, justiciability, and comity." Even when
structural principles are treated as fully constitutional matters, their
main influence is on the definition of individual rights. 12 Those
decisions that do deal unambiguously with structural values for
their own sake demonstrate less explanatory creativity than do deci-
sions dealing with rights, a fact that suggests a relative lack of
' No doubt this is in part justifiable because of the special capabilities and responsibilities
of the other branches of government in resolving such disputes. See Choper, note 6supra, at
1560-77 (as to federalism); see Frohnmayer, The Separation of Powers: An Essay on the Vitality of
the ConstitutionalIdea, 52 ORE. L. REV. 211 (1973) (as to separation of powers). Whatever the
reasons, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to rule on cases involving structural values is
often dramatic. See, e.g., McArthur v. Clifford, 393 U.S. 1002 (1968); Holmes v. United
States, 391 U.S. 936 (1968); Velvel v. Nixon, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Massachusetts v. Laird,
400 U.S. 886 (1970); DaCosta v. Laird, 405 U.S. 979 (1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter,
444 U.S. 996 (1979).
10 E.g., United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 346 U.S. 441 (1953); Scarborough v.
United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); National Cable Television Association v. United States,
415 U.S. 336 (1974).
1 As to equitable discretion, compare Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) with
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979). As to standing, compare
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) with Duke Power Company v. Carolina Environmen-
tal Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978). As to comity, compare Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971) with Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
12 E.G., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717(1974); San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
84 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
judicial interest in structural matters if not lower quality opinions.
Missing from decisions involving structural values is any use of the
doctrinal innovations used so often in decisions involving rights.
There are no analyses of motive, no dissections of legislative pur-
pose, no demands that less drastic means be used, no tiers of judicial
scrutiny.1 3 Instead, decisions having to do with structure fre-
quently rest on the baldest forms of "balancing" 14 and on unde-
veloped references to such generalities as "undue impairment" of
the states' functions. 5 Finally, cases in which rights are articulated
are frequently followed by a series of decisions that are designed to
"actualize" the original right, and in the process the right is often
recast in even more ambitious terms.' 6 Important cases that articu-
late structural values tend quickly to be limited and then largely
abandoned. 17
13 As to analyses of motive and legislative purpose, compare, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); or Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); or Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190 (1976) with Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913); United States v. Sullivan,.332
U.S. 689 (1948); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); United States v. Kahriger, 345
U.S. 22 (1953); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). With respect to the less
drastic means requirement, see Katzenbach v. McClung and compare, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973) (states' method of protecting potential life sweeps unnecessarily broadly
when protecting fetuses prior to viability) with Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,
433 U.S. 425 (1977) (statute that provides for the storage and screening of 42 million pages of
presidential documents and 880 presidential tape recordings does not unnecessarily subordi-
nate presidential requirements of confidentiality).
" On balancing, see South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers,
Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v.
Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 101 S.Ct. 1309 (1981);
Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 101 S.Ct. 715 (1981); National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun,J., concurring). See also Nixon v. Administrator ofGeneral
Services, note 13 supra, at 425.
1" New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 587 (1946) (Stone, concurring). Similarly,
the Court has said that "Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States'
integrity .. " Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975). "[N]Cither government
may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers." Metcalf
and Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926) (emphasis added).
'6 E.g., compare Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) with Keyes v. School
District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189 (1973); and Swann v. Charlotte-Meckleburg Board of Educa-
tion, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); and Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968). Or
compare Roe v. Wade, note 13 supra, with Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); and Colautti v.
Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
17 Compare United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) with Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services, note 13 supra. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at
833, with City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978); City of
Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444
(1978); North Carolina v. Califano, 435 U.S. 962 (1978); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Min. &
Reclam. Association, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2360, 2365-67 (1981).
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Modern judges work diligently at redesigning local educational
programs and at defining the acceptable number of square feet in a
prison cell. They void a multiplicity of laws relating to hair length,
sexual preference, and abortion. But they deal rarely and, for the
most part, gingerly with the great issues of power distribution that
were faced so ambitiously and successfully by the framers.
Academic writing generally reflects the same priority. Scholarly
discussion of constitutional structure often falls back on the more
familiar issues of individual rights. For example, Professor Black's
Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law illuminates the pos-
sibilities of argument based on structure only to apply quickly that
potential to the definition of individual rights.18 Professor Ely's
Democracy and Distrust emphasizes the central importance of demo-
cratic self-government in the constitutional design, but this insight is
enlisted chiefly in support of rationalizing the Warren Court's crea-
tive definition of individual rights. 9 (The book is then criticized,
not for overemphasizing the dependence of democratic processes on
individual rights, but for attempting to define rights by reference to
considerations other than the needs of individuals.)2" Many books
and articles appear on the injunctive devices that lower federal
courts are using against states in an effort to implement individuals'
constitutional rights. Much of this commentary seeks to concep-
tualize individuals' rights and the judicial function in ways that
permit significant aspects of self-government to be assumed by the
courts for the sake of remaking the world to suit some ideal
suggested by values implicit in certain rights. 2 Much of the rest of
the commentary emphasizes the practicalities of judicial enforce-
ment and largely assumes that, if courts are able to implement
individual rights effectively, implementation must have prior-
18 BLACK, SiRUCI URE ANi) RELAlIONSHIP IN CONSITIU I IONAL LAw (1969).
'9 ELY, I)EMOCRACY ANI) DISTRUST (1980).
20 Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-based Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L. J. 1063
(1980). See also Benedict, To Secure These Rights: Rights, Democracy, and Judicial Review in the
Anglo-American Constitutional Heritage, 42 OfIIo ST. L. J. 69 (1981); Grano, Ely's Theory of
Judicial Review: Preserving the Significance of the Political Process, id. at 167; Richards, Moral
Philosophy and the Search for Fundamental Values in Constitutional Law, id. at 319. But see Maltz,
Federalism and the Fourteenth Amendment: A Comment on Democracy and Distrust, id. at 209.
21 E.g., Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 IIARV. L. REV. 1281
(1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. Ri-V.
1 (1979); Eisenberg and Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation,
93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980).
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ity over other values. 22 Those that examine the remedial role of the
federal courts as an aspect of constitutional structure are quickly
urged to return to the proper business of legal scholars, which is
expressly defined as arguing about rights.
23
Scholarly preoccupation with rights is also evident in the tolerant
and highly imaginative approaches frequently taken in the defini-
tion of rights. Scholars commonly argue that it ought to be no bar
to a constitutional claim that there is ambiguity about whether the
framers intended a certain interpretation or that they did not con-
sider a possible interpretation of a constitutional right.
24 The ar-
gument is extended in such important areas as school desegregation
to include definitions of rights that are rather clearly in conflict with
historical intent.2 5 It is not uncommon for sophisticated scholars to
make unembarrassed arguments for an interpretation of a right
based largely on the personal values of the proponent of the right.
2 6
What more than this can be meant by assertions about "goodness"
27
or "minimal standards of human dignity
28 or "personhood"?
29
Such argumentation, even if it involves more than private values,
demonstrates how wide and free the scope of acceptable constitu-
tional argument about rights is. Indeed, scholarship indulges al-
most any amount of philosophical or psychological vagueness and
complexity when the goal is defining rights. We ponder how "just
wants"' 30 or the "mediation of liberal conversation"
31 or "equal
22 E.g., Chayes, note 21 supra. Diver, The Judge as Political Power Broker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (1979).
23 Eisenberg & Yeazell, note 21 supra, at 467. Cf. Ely, Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental
Values, 92 HARV. L. REV 5, 18 n.62 (1978); Fiss, note 21 supra, at 53.
24 E.g., Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B. U. L. REV. 204
(1980); Cover, Book Review, NEW REP. Jan. 14, 1978 at 26, 27; Munzer & Nickel, Does the
Constitution Mean What It Always Meant? 77 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1977). See also TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 816 (1978).
25 E.g., Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955).
26 For a general discussion, see Ely, note 23 supra, at 16-22.
27 Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV.
769, 797 (1971).
28 Eisenberg & Yeazell, note 21 supra, at 517.
29 TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 914.
30 Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor tbrough the
Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
31 ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 311 (1980).
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respect and concern"3 2 or the ideas of Roberto Unger"3 might bear
on the definition of rights.
In contrast, scholars often exhibit a kind of intellectual crabbed-
ness when structural claims are made. Consider the scholars who
were content to rest a defense of expanded institutional rights on an
assertion about "fostering minimal standards of dignity." They had
just tested federalism and separation of power claims about institu-
tional injunctions by demanding to see evidence that the framers
actually foresaw and opposed judicial operation of public institu-
tions.3 4 Almost any slight ambiguity about historical intent is urged
to help defeat structural claims.3 5 Similarly, arguments based on
concepts such as separation of powers3 6 or democratic accountabil-
ity37 are termed hopelessly indeterminate. The same scholar who
demands specificity in the concept of "state sovereignty" would
ground interpretations of individual rights on values such as "a
meaningful opportunity [for individuals] to realize their human-
ity."
3 8
In short, the hostile reaction to Usery is part of a broader pattern:
Many jurists and scholars tend to envision constitutional values
mainly in terms of individuals' rights and to undervalue judicial
protection of principles that allocate decision-making responsibility
among governmental units. This tendency may be largely a conse-
quence of the influence of the lawsuit in shaping views of the Con-
stitution. Lawsuits, of course, are discrete arguments, usually in-
32 DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 149, 227 (1977). For other elaborate efforts to
conceptualize equal protection, see Alexander, Modern Equal Protection Theories: A
Metatheoretical Taxonomy and Critique, 42 OHio Sr. L. J. 3 (1981); Simson, A Method for
Analyzing Discriminatory Effects under the Equal Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663 (1977).
'3 Tushnet, Darkness at the Edge of Town: The Contributions ofJohn Hart Ely to Constitutional
Theory, 89 YALE L. J. 1037, 1057-62 (1980).
a' Eisenberg & Yeazell, note 21 supra, at 497 ("Nor do the records of the constitutional
convention or the debate surrounding consideration of the Constitution counsel specifically
against judicial decisions affecting institutions traditionally regulated by executive offi-
cials.").
as E.g., Choper, note 6 supra, at 1588-90 (arguing that the intent of the framers with
regard to judicial enforcement of federalism limitations was ambiguous because, despite some
clear statements supporting such judicial responsibility, Federalists at times pointed to other
protections for the principle as well).
a Diver, note 22 supra, at 91-92; Chayes, note 21 supra, at 1307. See generally the
discussion in Nagel, Separation ofPowers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L.
REv. 661, 686-88 (1978).
as Tribe, note 20supra, at 1063, 1069-79; Tushnet, note 33 supra, at 1037, 1045-57.
a 'ribe, note 20supra, at 1077.
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volving an individual, and they are often resolved by labeling the
interests of one side as "rights"; thus, the lawsuit itself tends to con-
vert even organizational matters into individual concerns. But to see
the purposes of judicial review almost entirely in terms of securing
individual rights is to invert the priorities of the framers and ulti-
mately to trivialize the Constitution. The framers' political theory
was immediately concerned with organization, not individuals.
Their most important contributions had to do with principles of
power allocation-with the blending and separation of power
among the branches of government and with the bold effort to
create a strong national government while maintaining strong state
governments. This structure itself was to be the great protection of
the individual, not the "parchment barriers" that were later (and
with modest expectations) added to the document.39 Even the
danger of local majoritarian excess-so frequently cited today as a
justification for vigorous protection of individual rights-cannot
reconcile the modern emphasis on rights with the priorities of the
framers. Although aware of the threat posed by "faction," the
Federalists proposed social heterogeneity and layered government
as the protection, 4 ° not the Bill of Rights, which, after all, was
originally thought to restrain only the national government.
The modern priority on individuals' rights is striking in light of
the common assumption that judicial review allows for some con-
39 Apparently the idea of a bill of rights "never entered the mind of many of [the
framers]" until three days before adjournment of the Constitutional Convention.
SCHWARTZ, A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1971) 627. A common
argument for the exclusion of a bill of rights was that specific protections were unnecessary,
since the federal government had been granted only enumerated powers. Id. at 634. When
Madison proposed the Bill of Rights to Congress, its importance for preserving freedom was
not emphasized. He argued that it would be "neither improper nor altogether useless." Id. at
1028. See, generally, Rumble, James Madison on the Value of the Bill of Rigbts, in NOMOS XX:
CONSTITUTIONALISM 122 (Pennock & Chapman, eds., 1979). The general defense of the
proposed Constitution offered in THE FEDERALIST PAPERS continually emphasizes govern-
mental structure as the basic source of protection against tyranny: "In the compound repub-
lic of America, the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two distinct
governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate
departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people." THE FEDERALIST
PAPERS, No. 51 at 323 (Mentor, ed., 1961). See, generally, Diamond, The Federalist's View of
Federalism, in ESSAYS IN FEDERALISM 21, 53, 61 (Institute for Studies in Federalism, 1961). It
is true, of course, that the Bill of Rights was eventually adopted, and its importance in the
constitutional scheme may have been magnified both by the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment and by modern experience with judicial enforcement of rights. But neither
consideration justifies losing sight of the framers' original scheme.
40 On the importance of size and heterogeneity, see Diamond, note 39supra, at 55-59. See
also Choper, note 6 supra, at 1617.
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tinuity in the articulation of our most basic principles. In adopting a
viewpoint and a vocabulary that focuses on individuals, modern
judges and scholars have tended to shut themselves off from full
participation in the great debates about governmental theory begun
by the framers. The writings of Professor Choper, the bluntest and
most extreme critic of judicial enforcement of structural values,
provide a more specific understanding of how this participation has
been limited.
II.
Although the priority in favor of judicial protection of rights
rather than structure is widespread, it is often muted or qualified.
41
In Choper's writings, it is forthright. He argues that the two basic
structural principles-the enumeration of a limited number of
subjects as proper for congressional legislation and the separation of
the national government into three distinct branches-ought to be
left to the accommodations made in the political process. 42 Courts
should preserve their political "capital" for the protection of indi-
vidual rights.43
Choper argues that a court misallocates its efforts when it at-
tempts to enforce constitutional limitations on congressional power,
because the judiciary has no special competence to decide such
issues. "The functional, borderline question posed by federalism
disputes is one of comparative skill and effectiveness of govern-
mental levels: in a word, an issue of practicability."44 Judicial at-
tempts to influence such practical decisions are often futile and
make the courts unpopular politically-all for no important pur-
41 Professor Wechsler, for example, was careful not to exclude altogether a role for judicial
review in enforcing limitations on Congress (The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of
the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, in FEDERALISM, MATURE
AND EMERGENT 97, 108-09 [MacMahon, ed., 1955]). See also Freund, Umpiring the Federal
System, id., 159. See also text accompanying notes 9-38 supra.
42 Both arguments are contained in CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL
POLITICAL PROCESS, A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT (1980). The argument with respect to separation of powers is discussed in Monaghan,
Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REv. 296 (1980). Here I shall deal only with Choper's argument
with respect to federalism, and references will be to the article on which this aspect of the
book was based. Choper, note 6 supra, at 1552.
43 Choper, note 6 supra, at 1556, 1581, 1583.
44 Id. at 1556.
pose, since the political branches are able and inclined to preserve
an adequate level of power at the state level.
45
On the other hand, Choper argues that questions of individual
substantive rights are matters of "principle"-a term that is not
fully explained 46-on which the courts do have special compe-
tence. 47 These matters of principle cannot be entrusted to the
majorities in the political process, apparently because it takes judi-
cial skills to determine what they are. 48 Furthermore, federalistic
disputes cannot be squeezed into this substantive-rights mold by
focusing on the individuals' rights that might be served by decen-
tralization. There is "no solid historical or logical basis" for the
"assertion that federalism was meant to protect, or does in fact
protect, individual constitutional freedoms."'49 Federalism, Choper
asserts, was designed to protect states, not individuals, for the
purpose of achieving governmental efficiency in a large heteroge-
nous land.50 Insofar as the existence of state power was designed to
protect individuals from governmental restrictions on their liberty
(in a general sense), such protections are less important than sub-
stantive constitutional freedoms because the right "to choose in
smaller political units whether and how some activities would be
regulated," is "not for the ultimate security of defined liberties."51
In contrast, "the essence of the individual rights claim is that no
45Id. at 1560, et seq.
46 Choper contrasts federalism to matters of principle by suggesting that principles are
enforced without regard to immediate social costs because enforcement protects "the dignity
of the individual." Choper, note 6supra, at 1555. But it seems unlikely that he means by this
that the definition of rights or their protection is never compromised because of practical
trade-offs. Nor is it clear why federalism, as a constitutional requirement, might not have
content independent of "practical" considerations and sometimes be enforced despite im-
mediate costs. He denies that principles exclude policy considerations that require complex
factual determinations (ibid.). Much of his discussion implies that principles have inde-
pendent intellectual content which involves "technical considerations" and judicial expertise
(id. at 1574). In contrast, federalism is often treated as meaning little more than that
States must exist (see note 62 infra). However, in places Choper acknowledges that
federalism might involve content independent of the practical accommodations made in the
political process. Id. at 1599-1600. E.g., he concedes that Congress might make constitu-
tional errors with regard to what federalism requires. Id. at 1574.
4
7 Id. at 1554. cf. id. at 1556.
48 Choper, note 6 supra, at 1555, 1556.
491d. at 1611.
-0 Id. at 1614.
51 Id. at 1616.
90 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW [19ei
FEDERAUSM AS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE 91
organ of government, national or state, may undertake the chal-
lenged activity."
'52
Choper is right, of course, that the principle of federalism deter-
mines only the level of government that may restrict a liberty. But
to the extent that decentralized government permits decisions to be
made by local officials who might differ from national decision
makers in their accessibility or sensitivity, the principle does serve
"the ultimate security of a defined liberty" and is not on this ground
inferior to constitutional rights. Choper appears to acknowledge
this, although-true to the intellectual habits of the time-he in-
sists on referring to self-determination as a "freedom," as if a prin-
ciple cannot be taken seriously unless conceived of as attached to
individuals. 53 Choper explains the inferior status of the most basic
interest served by the principle of federalism with this remark:54
[It is] equally likely that the withdrawal of judicial review will
result in more fastidious concern for states' rights by the federal
political branches [and] [m]ore important, continuing jurisdic-
tion over states' rights claims can ... undermine [the Court's]
ability to perform the critical task of protecting all individual
liberties.
In the end, Choper's argument largely begs the question. Indi-
vidual rights should be protected in preference to the interest in
self-determination because judicial efforts to protect this interest
might be unnecessary and might conflict with the "critical" task of
protecting individuals' rights. But as Choper acknowledges, 55 judi-
cial protection of any right might reduce congressional concern over
52 Id. at 1555.
" His acknowledgment is somewhat ambivalent (id. at 1620). It is a further sign of the
widespread preoccupation with rights that Choper was criticized for not analogizing states'
rights sufficiently to individuals' right and for underestimating how far the latter depends on
the former. Benedict, note 20supra, at 75-76. Compare note 20 and accompanying text.
11 Id. at 1620-21. The discussion of this issue in the book is fuller hut not significantly
different. There Choper adds, but does not rely on, the argument that "the federalism
principle has simply outlived its usefulness." CHOPER, note 42 supra, at 255-56. He also
drops the adjective "critical," thus emphasizing the quantitative aspect of his argument that
judicial protection of federalism threatens the capacity to protect a wide array of individual
rights. But the protection of any single principle or right will naturally seem to be less
weighty than the protection of all others, so in this respect the argument proves nothing that
is specific to federalism. In short, the book, like the article, does not successfully escape the
need to show why self-determination (while difficult to protect) is not worth protecting. See
text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
55 Choper, note 6 supra, at 1604.
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the subject. And Choper does not mean that judicial protection of
substantive, individual rights-the right to work more than a ten-
hour day comes to mind-at times has not significantly reduced the
court's prestige and political power. Nor is an answer to the ques-
tion supplied by the adjective "critical." Why the protection of
rights is more critical than the protection of the principle of
federalism was the question at the outset.
Although Choper's specific treatment of the interest is self-
determination does not explain the inferior status of structural val-
ues, the direction and emphasis throughout his argument is sugges-
tive of an explanation. Consider again Choper's striking and
repeated assertion that the interests protected by federalism are
"not for the ultimate security of defined liberties. 56 This assertion is
not strictly relevant to self-determination because local control is
"ultimate" in the sense that no decision maker would be permitted
to remove certain decisions from the local level. Nevertheless, re-
quirements as to decision-making processes do not provide any
ultimate security with respect to outcomes. Indeed, local decision
making can be used to achieve very unfair outcomes-a realization
that was of constant concern to framers. 57 The interest in local
decision making might be thought less significant than individuals'
constitutional rights to the extent that the protection of rights re-
quires the realization of some substantive vision of a moral world.
While it may be a moral good to have some decisions made locally,
that value might not seem as important as an absolute constitutional
protection that restricts and prescribes outcomes, at least to the
extent that the values implicit in such rights are morally compel-
ling. 58 And Choper, of course, does assume that these values are
compelling and asserts that their realization serves "the dignity of
the individual."
59
It might be objected that it is possible (if not likely) to approve
morally of the decentralization of power to the same extent as one
might approve of a world where the values implicit in individual
constitutional rights are realized. But can a world of decentralized
authority be morally compelling to this degree if no specific version
5
6
E.g., id. at 1555, 1560, 1616, 1617.
'7 See, generally, WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 608-609 (1969).
58 On Choper's concern about outcomes, see Choper, note 6supra, at 1555, 1617-18.
59 Id. at 1555.
FEDERAUSM AS A FUNDAMENTAL VALUE 93
of decision-making allocation is constitutionally mandated? Choper
suggests throughout his argument that questions of individual
rights have specific, intellectual content. 60 Matters of federalism are
said not to be matters of principle and, thus, are not subject to
specific intellectual elaboration. Federalism is a process that is
elaborated by self-interest. 61 The only certainty provided by the
Tenth Amendment is that states must not be totally destroyed or
rendered ineffective. 62 An enormous range of power allocations is
consistent with the abstract requirement that some degree of state
sovereignty be maintained. Hence, Choper and others can argue
that the principle is sufficiently devoid of content that it can safely
be entrusted to the political process.
Aspects of Choper's argument, then, suggest that the priority of
rights over structure rests on a preference for constitutional values
that can be concretely implemented. 63 To be implemented, a value
must be measurable. To be measurable, it must be determinate and
specific. To the extent they are more concrete (a matter I will return
to shortly), rights may generally seem more important than pro-
cesses. Any specific, morally compelling outcomes that are re-
quired by rights can easily seem more important than vague pro-
cesses. Indeed, the basic premise of Choper's argument-that the
courts should allocate their efforts to the areas where they can
achieve the greatest payoff-attests to the profoundly instrumen-
talist 64 view that accompanies the preference for rights. Under this
view, a major criterion for assessing legal rules is their capacity to
produce measurable changes in the real world.
While the other major criticisms of Usery are different from
Choper's, they generally share this same basic orientation. 65 Tribe
o See note 46 supra.
61 Choper, note 6supra, at 1560-67, 1571, 1574, 1576, 1620.
62 Or "trampled" as Choper puts it (id. at 1560). Or "swallow the states whole" (id. at
1594). See also id. at 1563-68, 1570. See also text accompanying note 149 infra.
63 Choper does briefly recognize that judicial review serves such nonspecific purposes as
"nourishment of constitutional understanding" (id. at 1605). In suggesting that his federalism
proposal would not damage public understanding and the court's role in sustaining that
understanding, Choper is at his least convincing. See Monaghan, note 42 supra, at 306-7.
64 The term "instrumentalism" has various meanings. Here I use it to denote those intel-
lectual habits and inclinations described in Summers, Naive Instrumentalism and the Law in
LAW MORALITY AND SOCIETY, ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART (Hacker & Raz,
eds., 1977).
65 A different sort of attack was also made: that Usety violated stare decisis. For example,
Professor Cox summarized his criticism this way: "The short of the matter, therefore, is that
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and Michelman convert a decision that is apparently aimed at pro-
tecting the organizational principle of state sovereignty into a deci-
sion that would establish an individual right to some level of state
services. The daring of this reformulation itself attests to how
strong is the instrumentalist urge to speak the language of rights
rather than the more abstract language of organization. And, al-
though they deny that their interpretations of Usery would justify a
court to require some specific level of state services, 66 both argu-
ments depend on a judicial determination at some point of an ac-
ceptable level of concrete state services. The instrumentalist incli-
nation to use law to achieve tangible changes in the world is
reflected in these efforts to define structural values by reference to
some level of individual welfare.
The sorts of justifications that Tribe and Michelman offer for
rushing past 67 organizational matters to settle on their more far-
fetched interpretations 68 are also consistent with the instrumen-
talist orientation underlying Choper's arguments. For example,
Usery is criticized for not relying on specific evidence as to the effect
of the wage and hour provisions on state governments-for not
looking to the "actual impact of the regulations. '69 The opinion is
criticized for protecting the state as a private agent but not as
sovereign lawgiver and enforcer.7 0 It is criticized for protecting the
government's apparatus but not its policy-making prerogatives.
71
And it is criticized for protecting the exercise of its traditional
functions but not the sovereign prerogative to decide what new
although the decision in National League of Cities is almost surely consistent with the original
conception of the federal union and might not have surprised any constitutional scholar prior
to the 1930s, it is thoroughly inconsistent with the constitutional trends and decisions of the
past forty years." Cox, Federalism and Individual Rights under the Burger Court, 73 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1, 22 (1978). In this essay I do not dispute the accuracy of Cox's revealingly compla-
cent assessment, but I do inquire into how the modem decisional law (as well as the concerns
of scholars) could have come to depart so significantly from the constitutional design.
66 Michelman, note 5 supra, at 1190; Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1088-90.
67 Both authors deal briefly with the issue of local self-determination. Michelman, note 5
supra, at 1191 n.86 ("Further investigation of this sensitivity to community self-
determination, its role in the cited decisions, its theoretical significance, and its relationship
to the issues in NLC, must await another article."). Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1093 n. 109
("Political accountability ... poses a problem not only for state and local governments, but
also for Congress.").
66 See note 5 supra.
69 Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1072.
70 Michelman, note 5 supra, at 1168. Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1074.
71 Michelman, note 5 supra, at 1168. Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1074-75.
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functions ought to be assumed by the state. 72 In short, as Justice
Brennan complained, Usery created an "abstraction without sub-
stance."73 Or, as Michelman put it with understated relish, it is "no
easy matter to ascribe operational content to that notion [of sover-
eignty] ."4
In focusing on the difficulties of making the abstract concept of
federalism operational, the major criticisms of Usery are all strongly
instrumentalist. The belief that judicial protection of rights is more
valuable than judicial protection of structural principles may, then,
have become widespread because structural values are not easily
assimilated into the instrumentalist assumptions that underlie so
much of modern legal thought. .5 However, the precise relationship
between this operationalism and the critics' common emphasis on
individuals' rights remains somewhat mysterious. Their lack of
enthusiasm for structural values is more understandable than their
vigorous commitment to judicial protection of constitutional rights.
Why is it, after all, that the values implicit in constitutional rights
are thought of as being sufficiently specific to fit comfortably with
the instrumentalist demands of the major critics of Usery? If it is
difficult to identify when a federal statute interferes with some
"essential" level of state functioning, it is difficult to identify when
the provision of state services has dropped below some "minimally
adequate level."'7 6 If a state's "sovereignty" is an abstract idea, so is
an individual's "humanity."1
7 7
A principle like state sovereignty might, however, be thought to
be different from a principle such as free speech in that almost no
conceivable statute could impair the value behind the existence of
state governments. In contrast, it has become easy and customary
to think that specific statutes impair the values behind, for example,
the First Amendment. And it is possible to define the value pro-
tected by the Tenth Amendment in such a way that its impairment
72 Tribe, note 5 supra, at 1074. Michelman, note 5 supra, at 1172.
73 426 U.S. at 860.
74 Miehelman, note 5 supra, at 1166.
5 See Summers, Profesor Fuller'sJurisprudence and America's Dominant Philosophy of Law, 92
1 IARV. L. RF;v. 433 (1978).
7" A matter that is acknowledged by both Tribe and Miehelman (see note 66 supra).
77 Tribe, note 20 supra, at 1077 ("The crux of any determination that a law unjustly
discriminates against a group... [is] that the law is part of a pattern that denies those subject
to it a meaningful opportunity to realize their humanity.").
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by any one statute is improbable. The Court, for instance, has said
that the commerce power may not be used in a way that centralizes
all power in the national government.7 8 No statute other than one
that abolished the states could do that. But no conceivable statute
threatens the larger purposes behind the First Amendment either.
Whether these purposes are defined systemically ("the maintenance
of open public debate for the sake of democratic decision making")
or personally ("the protection of access to and use of information for
the sake of autonomous individuals"), these large values are not
threatened by any discrete act. A statute that prohibits the reading
of pornographic books in one's home will not destroy autonomy
unless accompanied by a wide array of other restrictions that de-
stroy other sources of personal autonomy.7 9 Even a major instance
of prior restraint over the publication of political news could not by
itself destroy the level of debate generally necessary for the demo-
cratic system to operate. 80 Discrete governmental restrictions do
threaten these larger values cumulatively and in the long run.
Rights can be made operational, then, not so much because the
values they serve are specific or concrete, but because they must be.
Rights must be made operational precisely because their purposes
are remote and general and can be undercut only gradually and
insensibly. But that, of course, is also true of the exercise of federal
power as it gradually diminishes state sovereignty.
Although rights are not innately more concrete or measurable
than structural values, concentration on rights does lead to in-
strumentalist habits of thought. This is because noninstrumentalist
justifications for decisions that protect rights are never fully satis-
factory. Even Judge Hans Linde's well-known effort to emphasize
noninstrumental justifications for major Warren era cases demon-
strates the difficulty of severing rights from instrumentalism. He
asked, "What would be the implications for the Constitution, in its
role as primary national symbol, of a decision saying that a bit of
organized public prayer never hurt anyone?"'" This question was
designed to suggest that compliance with judicial decrees-
concrete alterations of actual behavior-is less important than the
78 National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 37.
79Cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
80Cf. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
81 Linde,Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALiU L. J. 227, 238 (1972).
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sense of understanding and reassurance that the Court's statement
of principle creates. 82 As important as this argument is in supple-
menting the instrumentalists' narrower understanding, emphasiz-
ing as it does the immediate and tangible consequences of deci-
sions, 83 it is not fully satisfying. To the extent that a court can make
compelling the normative premise in its decision regarding an indi-
vidual right, the court has stated reasons for realizing that right in
actual situations. Parties who have convincingly been labeled
"wronged" may be reassured by their abstract vindication, but they
will also want the matter righted. And what is good for one indi-
vidual is morally compelling for others in analogous situations.
Thus, the vindication of a constitutional "right" localizes the moral
claim in an individual and thereby creates an inevitable insistence
on "actualization. '8 4 In short, the constant impulse to define rights
in measurable ways derives from the fact that, as Choper em-
phasized, constitutional rights are individuals' rights. Rights are
specified-the percentage of each race that should attend public
schools, the extent of acceptable governmental participation in
parochial education, the number of square feet required in prison
cells-to give some assurance that each individual can receive
whatever moral benefit is inherent in the right.
Because structural values need not be immediately localized in
individuals, noninstrumental justifications may be more fully
satisfying when applied to matters of governmental organization
than when applied to matters of right. Such justifications, because
not linked to concrete alterations of the world, would not be cred-
ited or even noticed by those absorbed in matters of individual
rights. Such justifications satisfactorally explain Usery.
III.
The Court's decision in National League of Cities v. Usery is
understandable and admirable once the intellectual habits asso-
ciated with thinking about constitutional rights are set aside. The
Court did not attempt to limit congressional power by a restrictive
definition of "commerce among the States." Such a tactic was
82 Id. at 232, 237, 238, 239.
83 See Summers, note 64supra, and Linde, note 81 supra, at 229-30.
14 See Fiss, note 21 supra.
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employed by the Court prior to 1937 when, for example, it at-
tempted to distinguish such local matters as "manufacture" from
the national concern, "commerce." 85 This approach, like present-
day efforts to actualize rights, involved the Court in efforts to create
and maintain a concrete, identifiable "constitutional" condition-a
condition that then consisted of a "proper" division of substantive
areas of regulation between the state and nation. The effort, of
course, is now discredited. The Usery Court, instead, emphasized
the abstract concept behind the principle of federalism; it spoke of
states as being "coordinate elements" and as needing "separate and
independent existence. '8 6 This language does not require some
tangible, static system of power allocation, a fact that was em-
phasized by the unwillingness of the Court to rest its decision on
any specific measurement of the burden imposed on the states by
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA).87 The Court's language is
true to the idea of federalism, in that it describes a process rather
than an edifice.88
In applying these abstractions to the facts of Usery, the Court first
distinguished those cases that involved the exercise of federal au-
thority over individuals from those over states "as states."8 9 It
emphasized the importance of the employment relationship for the
effective exercise of state functions9" and (in general terms) the sorts
of burdens created by the FLSA for important programs carried on
by state and local governments. 9' It described the burdens as af-
fecting broad areas of governmental activity, 92 including areas
where states have traditionally delivered services. 93 These factors,
I believe, can be shown to define state sovereignty in a way that is
entirely consistent with the Federalists' political theory. Although
the Court in Usery did not specifically refer to this theory, the main
s5E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
86 426 U.S. at 849, 851.
871 d. at 85 1.
s8 See Wechsler, note 41 supra, passim. See also Freund, note 41 supra, at 159-61;
FRIEDRICH, TRENDS OF FEDERALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 3-11 (1968).
89 426 U.S. at 845.
90 Id. at 845, 847-48, 851.
91 Id. at 846-5 1.
92 Id. at 847, 848, 850.
9Id. at 851.
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elements of the opinion are protective of the purposes that the
framers intended the states to serve in* the "federal" system. 94
Those purposes, although not reducible to anything concrete or
measurable, are well known and important. Proponents of the pro-
posed constitution who, like Madison and Hamilton, argued for a
strong national government had to answer the fears of those who
thought that the new national government would consolidate all
power at the national level. 95 The reasons that the anti-Federalists
feared this possibility were varied. They feared that regional inter-
ests would be undervalued in a legislature so small and so physi-
cally remote96 and, more generally, that the quality of political
accountability would suffer because the national leadership would
become culturally and psychologically alienated from localities.
97
They argued that national authority would not be sufficiently re-
sponsive to elicit voluntary compliance, so that force would become
the mechanism of government. 98 They were concerned that the
opportunity for participation and identification with government
would be too limited, ultimately threatening devotion to liberty
itself.99 Such fears were sufficient to threaten the adoption of the
proposed constitution and to force not only the adoption of the first
ten amendments, but also the creation of a theory of federalism that
explained and justified the proposed system of power allocation.1 00
This theory turned the anti-Federalists' emphasis on the size and
heterogeneity of the country into a powerful argument for adopting
the Constitution. It was, the Federalists argued, the size and variety
91 I am using the modern nomenclature which nearly reverses framers' usage. See
Diamond, note 39supra.
95 Apparently there was at least some basis for the anti-Federalist fear that some
Federalists wished literally to abolish the states. See MAIN, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS, CRI-
TICS OF THE CONSTITUTION 121 (1961); SCHWARTZ, note 39supra, at 597. More generally,
however, the anti-Federalists feared that the proposed constitution provided inadequate
safeguards against the enlargement of federal power beyond the enumerated powers. See,
e.g., SCHWARTZ, note 39supra, at 572, 592-93, 653, 526.
as See MAIN, note 95 supra, at 129; KENYON, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS xli (1966).
11 KENYON, note 96 supra, at xl, li, liii.
91 Id. at 210, xl.
9 Id. at 388. Subsequent writings attest to the importance of such arguments. See, e.g.,
DAHL & TUFTE, SIZE AND DEMOCRACY (1973); MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERI-
CAN DEMOCRACY 190 (1966); TOCQUEVILLE, II DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 79, 148, 307-11
(1970) (Arlington House).
100 See, e.g., LEWIS, ANTI-FEDERALIST V. FEDERALIST 28 (1967).
within the nation that would reduce the likelihood of overreaching
by the national government.' 0 ' Because state governments would
remain alternative power centers, the national government would
be in constant competition with state governments. 0 2 This
would curtail the tendency of the national government toward un-
responsiveness and would prevent excessive centralization of
power. Thus, the anti-Federalists' argument that state governments
were more responsive was turned on its head: The very efficiency
and responsiveness of local governments would enable them to act
as a "counterpoise"' 0 3 to national authority. The existence of states
could, then, make practical what at the time seemed a contradiction
in terms-a large country with a strong national government that
would not degenerate into a "tyranny. 
°
104
The theory of the proponents of the new national government, in
short, depended on assurances that effective state governments
could continue to exist. As modern writers also argue,' 0 5 the states'
influence on the national political process was identified as a major
protection for state sovereignty, and this influence was thought to
depend in part on how the electoral process was organized.'0°
However, unlike the modern writers, the Federalists understood
and emphasized that influence through electoral politics presup-
poses that state governments would exist as alternative objects of
loyalty to the national government. 10 7 Unless the residents of the
states and their political representatives understand that states are
entitled to claim governmental prerogatives and unless they per-
ceive states as legitimate, separate governments, there will be no
impulse to use political influence to protect the interests of states as
governmental entities. It is, as Madison put it, "the existence of
subordinate governments to which the people are attached [that] forms
a barrier against the enterprises of ambition .... 108
101 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, Nos. 10, 51.
102 See text accompanying notes 108, 117-24, 133 infra.
103 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 17 at 9, 20.
104 See MAIN, note 95 supra, at 130; DAHL & TUFTE, note 99 supra, at 4-11; THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS, Nos. 9, 10.
105 See WECHSLER, note 41 supra; CHOPER, note 6 supra, at 1560-65.
106 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 45.
107 See text accompanying notes 117-24 infra. See generally DIAMOND, note 94 supra, at
46.
108 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 46 at 299 (emphasis added).
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The justifications offered in Usery for limiting congressional
power over commerce are directly relevant to preserving those pre-
conditions necessary for the states to act as a counterpoise to na-
tional authority. The factors emphasized by the Court all define
state sovereignty in the sense relevant to the Federalists' theory,
because they all preserve the capacity of state governments to elicit
enough respect and loyalty to act as legitimate competitors to the
central government. These sources of legitimacy' 0 9 can be grouped
into four categories: symbolic, regulatory, communicative, and or-
ganizational. All can be shown to be inherent in the Federalists'
theory and all connect Usery to existing case law.
1. Symbolism as a source of legitimacy. The framers of the Constitu-
tion were acutely aware of the emotional underpinnings of govern-
mental authority. Madison referred to "that veneration which time
bestows on every thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and
freest governments would not possess the requisite stability." 110
Similarly, Hamilton spoke of "impressing upon the minds of the
people affection, esteem, and reverence towards the govern-
ment."'' Supreme Court decisions have reflected the same sen-
sitivity, holding that the national government could not control the
location of a state capital," 2 suggesting that the statehouse
would be exempt from federal taxation, 1 3 and, after some hesita-
tion, protecting state court proceedings from interruptions by fed-
eral courts. " 4 None of these decisions can be explained on the basis
of actual impact on the functioning of states. The business of state
government can go on once the capital city has been located, a tax
on a state operation might be greater in amount and consequence
than a tax on the statehouse, and state courts would not dry up
because of occasional interruptions by federal injunctions. All these
decisions are explicable only as efforts to protect the symbolism of
1" "Legitimacy" has been defined as the capacity to engender and maintain the belief that
the existing political institutions are "appropriate," (see LiPsEr, POLmCAL MAN 64 [Anchor
ed. 1963]), "rightful," or "entitled to rule" (FRIEDRICH, TRADITION AND AUTHoRITY 89
[1972]). I treat the effectiveness of a government in meeting the needs of its citizens as one
source of legitimacy. Compare Lipset, supra, ch. 3, with Friedrich, supra, at 89.
110 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 49 at 314.
I
1
Id., No. 17, at 120.
112 Coyle v. Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
11a New York v. United States, note 15 supra, at 582.
114 Younger v. Harris, note I1 supra.
the states as sovereign governments and, therefore, their capac-
ity to sustain emotional attachments.
The symbolism of a state that is unable to control the wages and
hours of its own employees is stark. The Usery Court's repeated
emphasis on the effect of the federal rules on the states, as states,
can be understood in this light. The apparatus of government may
not be a special aspect of sovereignty in some exalted philosophical
sense, 115 but psychologically the apparatus does represent the gov-
ernment's authority to the people. The Court's reliance on the
impact of the FLSA on such traditional areas of state control as
police and fire protection is also responsive to the requirements of
symbolic authority. Again, as Usery's critics maintain,
"sovereignty" might be equally involved in innovative functions as
in traditional ones, but the longer an area has been subject to state
control the more symbolic of state authority that area becomes.
Psychologically, a federal burden on a state water bottling opera-
tion, for example, simply does not threaten the legitimacy of a state
government in the same way as would federal burdens on public
education or police protection.
1 6
2. Regulatory authority as a source of legitimacy. The Federalists
understood that any government "must be able to address itself
immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to
its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon
the human heart." 17 They argued repeatedly that states would
have a natural advantage over the national government because of
"the nature of the objects" of state regulation. 11 8 States, Hamilton
thought, would control the "variety of more minute interests...
which will form ... many rivulents of influence running through
every part of the society. . .. " "9 Not only would state control be
pervasive but it would also involve
120
5 See note 71 supra.
116 Cf. New York v. United States, note 113 supra. In many other cases, the Supreme
Court has shown an inclination to protect "traditional" areas of state governmental activity
from federal encroachment. See, eg., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, note
12 supra; Labine v. Vincent, note 12 supra.
117 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 16 at 116.
1181d., No. 17, at 119.
119 Id. at 119-20.
120 Id. at 120.
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all those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the
sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake . . . im-
pressing upon the minds of the people affection, esteem, and
reverence towards the government.
Madison echoed these arguments' 2' and added to them by appeal-
ing to a widely held assumption that states could be expected to
deliver services effectively. 122 In contrast to all these resources
available to state governments, the powers granted the national
government were "few and defined."'I2 That is,
1 2 4
[R]elating to more general interests, they will be less apt to come
home to the feelings of the people; and, in proportion, less likely
to inspire an habitual sense of obligation and active sentiment of
attachment.
Many of the Federalists' arguments regarding the natural advan-
tages of state power sound quaint today and might have been
somewhat disingenuous at the time. 125 Certainly, the Federalists
cannot be read as predicting or guaranteeing the primary of state
power. 126 But the underlying idea in these reassurances cannot be
dismissed lightly because it is a necessary part of the Federalists'
larger theory: to be able to protect themselves in the political pro-
cess states would need (and were assured under the proposed Con-
stitution) the capacity to elicit loyalty by providing for the needs of
their residents. Consequently, there is nothing improper or unusual
in judicial sensitivity to the need to preserve traditional areas of
"I1 "The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few
and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace,
negotiation, and foreign commerce; with which last the power of taxation will, for the most
part, be connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people, and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the state." THE FEDERALIST
PAPI'ERS, No. 45, at 292-93; see also No. 46 at 294-95.
£2 ". . . [lit is only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of
things, be advantageously administered." TiE FEDERAlISI PAPERS, No. 46, at 295.
123 Id., No. 45, at 292.
£24 Id., No. 17, at 120; see also Nos. 45 at 292, 46 at 295.
125 See Diamond, note 94supra.
12C Ibid.
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primary control for state authority. Such sensitivity is com-
monplace in areas like education' 27 or family law.12 8
Nevertheless, a fundamental fear of Usery's critics was that the
principle of the case could not be restricted to protecting the states'
governing apparatus but would necessarily be extended to protect
state control over policies regarding private citizens as well.' 2 9
Why, they asked, is state control over employees more a sovereign
matter than state control over citizens? But Usery does not require
that any particular area of policy necessarily be reserved for state
control. The Federalists' reassurances make clear that the basic idea
behind enumerating federal powers was to reserve to the states the
capacity for a pervasive relationship with their citizenry-to re-
quire that federal control over citizens be exceptional and specially
justified. 13 The extension of the FLSA to state employees would
have insinuated a federal presence into nearly every activity carried
on by the state, which would have seriously undermined the role of
the states as the governments with broad primary contact with the
citizenry.13
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on the importance of the services
affected by the FLSA extension-"fire prevention, police protec-
tion, sanitation, public health ."132 -tracks the framers'
assumption that states would control most policies of personal
importance to people. And Madison's acknowledgement of the im-
portance to state sovereignty of effective delivery of such services is
echoed in the Court's concern that the wage and hour provisions
would disrupt what the states had regarded as useful methods of
administration. In short, the FLSA was threatening to all the ele-
127 E.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, note 12supra; Brown v.
Board of Education (II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
128 E.g., Labine v. Vincent, note 12 supra. I do not mean to imply, of course, that
the Court consistently honors the tradition of state control over such matters. See, e.g.,
Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
But such intrusions are made against a backdrop of the acknowledged propriety of general
state authority over such matters. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 499
(Harlan, concurring) (1965).
129 E.g., 426 U.S. at 833, 875 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
130 See notes 121, 122 supra. See also Wechsler, note 41 supra, at 98: "National action has
thus always been regarded as exceptional in our polity, an intrusion to be justified by some
necessity, the special rather than the ordinary case."
131 Federal control over state employees who perform general functions, then, is analogous
to general federal common law in that both, almost by definition, are at odds with the
concept of enumerated powers. Cf. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
132 426 U.S. at 851.
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ments of what the framers thought were the special characteristics
of state regulatory authority. When a single federal statute com-
promises the states' authority to respond effectively and pervasively
to the ordinary concerns of personal importance to the people, the
Court is justified in sensing an incompatibility with the assump-
tions behind the constitutional design.
3. Communication as a source of legitimacy. How did the Federalists
think that states might resist encroachments of federal power? One
answer was that the states would provide a constant method of
measuring whether federal policy had strayed too far from the
popular will:
133
Either the mode in which the federal government is to be con-
structed will render it sufficiently dependent on the people, or it
will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that
dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their con-
stituents. On the other supposition, it will not possess the
confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation will be
easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported
by the people.
A second sort of answer was that the states would organize resis-
tance both within their respective borders and among the other
states. 134 The states would "sound the alarm."' 3 5 The national
government might then be faced with "the disquietude of the
people; ... the frowns of the executive magistracy of the State; the
embarrassments created by legislative devices .... ,136 In the first of
these roles, states require a formal capacity to articulate possible
alternates to federal policy. In the second, states require the capac-
ity to express dissatisfaction with federal policies officially. Such
considerations must underlie judicial reluctance to expose official
state legislative acts to federal injunctions 37 or to supplant the state
appointment process.'
38
133 TIF. FEDERAI.IST PAPERS, No. 46 at 300.
131 Id. at 296-99.
135 Id. Nos. 44-46.
136 Id., No. 46 at 297.
137 For example, typically courts threaten to raise funds themselves but do not directly
order state legislatures to raise taxes. E.g., Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala.
1972), aff'd in part sub. nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
""Cf. Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974); Carter
v. Jury Comm'n., 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Lance v. Plummer, 384 U.S. 929 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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Usery is responsive to the need to protect the capacity of state
governments to represent and articulate opposition to federal
power. The Court properly noted the special and fundamental
character of the power to set wages and hours, 139 for federal control
over basic working conditions would be a major way of shifting the
loyalty of state employees to the national government. To the ex-
tent that opposition to federal policies must be expressed through
the state employees who have daily and immediate contact with the
citizenry, the capacity for opposition would be compromised.
Moreover, the Court's emphasis on the impact of the FLSA on the
states, as states, has widely been understood to insulate from con-
gressional control such formal elements of governance as the adop-
tion of legislation or the promulgation of regulations. 140 To the
extent that Usery's principles protect these formal elements of policy
articulation, the decision protects the capacity of states-
governments rather than individual leaders-to endorse (if not im-
plement) policies that can stand as potential alternatives to national
policy.
4. Organizational authority as a source of legitimacy. The Federalists
thought that the states would draw loyalty from the people on the
same principle that "a man is more attached to his family than to his
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large.
S. .141 Physical proximity would be reinforced by immediate
opportunities for participation in local government: 142
Into the administration of [the governments of the states] a
greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of
these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By
the superintending care of these, all the more domestic and per-
sonal interests of the people will be regulated and provided for.
With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and
minutely conversant. And with the members of these will a
greater proportion of the people have ties of personal acquain-
tance and friendship, and 'of family and party attachments; on
the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well be ex-
pected most strongly to incline.
139 426 U.S. at 845, 851.
140 EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).
141 THE FEDERALIST PAPERS, No. 17 at 119.
142 1d., No. 46, at 294-95.
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The capacity of states to elicit participation in government depends
in large part on their authority to organize and control the units of
local government. 143 It is by determining the appropriate amount
of decentralization over such matters as taxation or public education
that states can attempt to match local control to local interest, and
the resulting political participation serves to give people a stake in
public decisions and a sense of identification with their govern-
ment. The Court has repeatedly recognized the special importance
to state governments of control over such organizational deci-
sions. 1
44
The Court in Usery was sensitive to the impact of the wage and
hour provisions on local participation. It noted, for example, that
the provisions would lead to "a significant reduction of traditional
volunteer assistance which has been in the past drawn on to com-
plement the operation of many local governmental functions."'1 45
The decision insulated political subdivisions from the wage and
hour provisions on the ground that these "derive their authority
and power from their respective States.'1 4 6 At least one critic
somehow found this protection of state authority proof that Usery
was not aimed at protecting "the state as object of political loy-
alty."'14 7 The framers understood the sources of loyalty more
realistically. In their scheme, it is important that the emotional
referent of local governments continue to match their legal referent,
so that the states derive full advantage from self-government at the
local level. Federal control over wages and hours of employees of
political subdivisions would begin to displace to the national gov-
ernment the allegiance and identification of those who are part of
local government.
In summary, the Court in Usery displayed a sure feel for pro-
tecting the "essential role of the States in our federal system of
government" as the framers defined that role. Despite the Court's
143 Evidence suggests that the sense of identification and participation is possible to a far
greater extent in very small units of government. See DAHL & TUFTE, note 99 supra, at 60,
63, 84. On the relationship between state authority and local authority, see TOCQUEVILLE, I.
45, 51, 52, 79, 148; II, 109. For a detailed account of the advantages of localism and of the
legal status of cities, see Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
144 E.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, note 12supra; Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
145 426 U.S. at 850-51.
146 Id. at 855-56.
147 Michelman, note 5 supra, at 1169.
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failure to refer specifically to the role of the states as political
competitors to the national government, the tracking of the
Federalists' theory was not coincidental. The case law that in-
formed and shaped the Court's assumptions about federalism was
no doubt influenced by the framers' ideas, and, in any event, the
Usery Court, like the framers, focused on what is necessary for the
states' "separate and independent existence."'
48
Usery, then, was not incomprehensible to its critics because its
holding and explanation were unrelated to the Constitution. It was
incomprehensible because of the critics' intellectual habits which
had developed out of long concern for questions of individuals'
rights.
Decisions like Usery that protect constitutional structure are dif-
ferent from the more familiar efforts of courts to protect rights.
Structural principles such as federalism are intended to maintain a
rough system of power allocation over long periods of time. There
is no analogy to the adjudication of rights where, at some point in
time, desegregation must be achieved or enough services must be
provided. Structure is a process that is maintained, not achieved.
The courts' function in matters of structure is largely to sustain (or
at least not undercut) the understandings, the attitudes, and the
emotional ties that underlie the system of power allocation. These
objectives may be intangible, but they are directly relevant to pre-
serving the constitutional system, since that system presupposes
divided loyalties and complex attitudes toward authority. Struc-
tural decisions are not necessarily based on the injustice of depriv-
ing a single individual of a particular allocation of authority. Hence,
the assertion of structural values is not essential in every case where
they are potentially implicated; nevertheless, their assertion in
especially appropriate cases like Usery is important because of the
indirect, long-run consequences to the whole political system of
ignoring the underpinnings of constitutional structure. These con-
sequences are not adequately described by images of states as
"empty vessels" or "gutted shells."' 49 Such metaphors are more
expressive of the critics' urge to render the issues tangible (and
therefore more familiar) than of the values at stake in a dispute
148 426 U.S. at 845 (quoting from Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. [7 Wall.] 71 [1869]).
149 E.g., Tribe, note Ssupra, at 1072 ("empty vessels"), 1071 ("gutted shell"); Choper, note
62 supra.
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about federalism. In the Federalists' scheme, the states were to
be maintained partly for their own sakes and partly as a tool for
assuring adequate levels of political responsiveness, competition,
and participation.' 50
Much of the scholarly and judicial attention to the definition of
individual rights is aimed at achieving these same goals by more
direct means. Definitions of free speech, equal protection, pro-
cedural due process, privacy, and other rights are grounded on the
belief that such protections will produce the kind of independent
individuals who can participate vigorously in the political process.
And it may be that these rights are ultimately important to the
potential for self-government. But, quite aside from the familiar
charge that enforcement of such rights centralizes too much power
at the national level, excessive attention to rights can be a threat to
self-government. A subtle conflict exists between rights, taken too
seriously, and structure. The frame of mind that is created by
concentration on the direct, tangible protection of individuals does
not easily appreciate the less determinate requirements of constitu-
tional structure. A judicial system deeply engaged in achieving
immediate justice for all individuals will not be sensitive to, or
much interested in, the intellectual and emotional preconditions for
political competition between sovereigns. The "constitutional law"
that develops in such a system will be more attuned to the demands
of measurement and the excitement of accomplishment than to the
full range of the framers' concerns.
Suppose for a moment that divided and limited loyalties are not
as important as the right to contraceptives for preserving the capac-
ity for self-government in the modern world. At least, a decision
like Usery that presumed there might be some small usefulness in
promoting the framers' organizational theory ought not to have
been dismissed as constitutionally incomprehensible. That the de-
cision was so widely unappreciated ought to be unsettling to any-
one who is not certain that the framers' structural principles are
worthless today.
150 THE FEDERALIsT PAPERS, No. 45 at 289. See also text at notes 94-104 supra.

